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The “Golden Rules” for 
Eliminating Disparities: Title VI, 
Medicare, and the 
Implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act 
David Barton Smith† 
Abstract 
Addressing health care disparities rarely focuses on how the 
“gold” (meaning the federal dollars flowing into the nation’s health 
system) has, at different times, both widened and narrowed health 
care disparities. This paper describes (1) the early attempts to use the 
power of the federal purse to address disparities that led to the 
enactment of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; (2) how Title VI, 
as applied in the implementation of Medicare, reduced disparities; and 
(3) the lessons that this story offers for similar opportunities in the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Reducing 
disparities with the implementation of the ACA will require (1) 
rekindling the spirit of the grass roots movement that captured the 
Title VI enforcement process with the implementation of Medicare; 
(2) exposing adversaries through data disclosure and taking advantage 
of the “invisible army” that supports these goals; (3) using the power 
of both the economic and ethical versions of the Golden Rule; and (4) 
creating the political insulation and urgency necessary to reduce 
health care disparities. 
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Introduction 
Most approaches to addressing racial disparities in health care in 
the United States do not look “outside the box.” They focus on 
incremental, palliative changes leaving the basic system for financing 
care untouched.1 Yet, health care has always been shaped by the 
economic version of the Golden Rule—those with the gold, rule. 
Health care providers respond to financial incentives and those 
incentives, for most of our history, have contributed to disparities.  
Indeed, many argue that race has always been a concealed part of 
the logic of health care financing in the United States. Race is a part 
of the “American exceptionalism” that has made the financing of the 
U.S. health system so different from that of other developed nations.2 
Race has contributed to making the United States the only remaining 
industrialized nation lacking some form of universal health insurance 
coverage for its citizens. Race is hidden in the U.S. health system’s 
compromise patchwork of solutions: the expansion of private 
insurance, the creation of producer cooperative solutions in the form 
of voluntary Blue Cross plans, the creation of its dominant, voluntary 
hospitals sector, the ideology of individualism, and the opposition to 
public solutions in favor of the promotion of free market solutions. All 
of these “solutions” have a disparate impact on blacks and other 
disadvantaged minority groups, mocking the now universally 
 
1. See generally ALISON MACK, ET AL., INST. OF MED., SUPPORTING A 
MOVEMENT FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH EQUITY: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 
(2014). 
2. See BEATRIX HOFFMAN, HEALTH CARE FOR SOME: RIGHTS AND 
RATIONING IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1930 at x, xi (2012); JAMES 
MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
181-82 (2003); JAAP KOOIJMAN, . . . AND THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL 
HEALTH: THE INCREMENTAL STRATEGY TOWARD NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15-17 (1999); JILL 
QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE 
WAR ON POVERTY 4 (1994). 
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embraced national goal of the elimination of health care disparities 
that have remained unchanged for more than thirty years.  
Yet, also concealed in the evolution of the U.S. health system is a 
more hopeful story. At times, the flow of federal funding has been 
directed to combat racial and social class distinctions that have been 
used to divide and fragment the U.S. health system. The most 
significant example of this took place a half century ago with the 
introduction of Medicare. For the first time, the federal government 
used the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
control the flow of federal funds to hospitals. This Article tells the 
story of that struggle. In Part I, I describe the early attempts to use 
the power of the federal purse to address disparities that led to the 
enactment of Title VI. In Part II, I discuss how Title VI was enforced 
in the implementation of Medicare. Finally, in Part III, I discuss the 
lessons that this story offers for similar opportunities in the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
I. Early Federal Use of the Power of the Purse 
A. Health Care Before the Civil Rights Movement 
Despite fading memories and a peculiar rebirth of nostalgia about 
the pre-Medicare and Medicaid days, health care in the United States 
at the end of World War II was markedly different than it is now. 
Indeed, it was appalling. Those without insurance or the ability to 
pay were relegated to the charity wards and the indigent clinics of 
public hospitals and medical schools. Blacks were at the bottom of 
this caste system of care. In the South, blacks were either excluded 
altogether from community hospitals, or they were relegated to 
separate and typically inferior accommodations in basement wards or 
separate buildings. The result was a much higher rate of riskier home 
deliveries and a higher death rate from automobile accidents because 
of more restricted access to hospital emergency care.3 Many blacks 
had to rely on those white physicians who would accept them as 
patients, often in segregated waiting rooms where they would wait 
until all of the white patients had been seen.4 Similar discrimination 
took place in public hospital and medical school clinics. In northern 
cities, segregation of hospital and medical care was often almost as 
complete as in the South, only in the North, the segregation of 
hospitals and medical care was shaped by residential segregation and 
 
3. Albert Dent, Hospital Services and Facilities Available to Negroes in the 
United States, 18 J. NEGRO EDU. 326, 327 (1949); Hoffman, supra note 
2, at 63-64, 81-85. 
4. Interview with Mattie Gadson (1996) (recording available in the Temple 
University Library). 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
The “Golden Rules” for Eliminating Disparities: Title VI, Medicare, and 
the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
36 
the informal practice patterns of physicians and hospitals. For 
example, Chicago hospitals in 1960 came close to matching the 
segregation patterns of hospitals in the Deep South in spite of laws 
passed prohibiting hospital discrimination in admission practices.5  
If one could not access a service, one could not use it. Rates of use 
of all forms of inpatient or outpatient care were substantially lower 
for blacks as opposed to whites. Usage rates for services of all kinds 
were also directly related to income. However, usage rates were still 
lower for blacks regardless of income.6 The degree of morbidity and 
thus the need for services was greater in the black population as well 
as in low income populations regardless of race. From the beginning of 
modern medicine in the United States (circa 1910), the harsh 
economic version of the Golden Rule (those with the gold, rule), as 
opposed to its ethical version (do unto others as you would have done 
unto you), ruled. Consequently, the use of medical services was 
directly related to income and inversely related to need. 
Black physicians were also excluded from privileges and training 
opportunities at most historically white medical schools and hospitals. 
As many as 500 black hospitals, often under-resourced, had been 
created to serve black patients and physicians.7 Even in the white 
facilities that accepted black patients (though, often in segregated 
accommodations), their white medical staffs typically refused staff 
privileges to black physicians, thus preserving the economic monopoly 
such exclusion assured the white medical staffs. Indeed, the first 
successful effort in eliminating racial discrimination in hospital 
privileges involved an anti-trust case rather than a civil rights 
challenge. In February of 1961, ten black Chicago physicians filed a 
suit in U.S. District Court against multiple defendants including the 
state of Illinois, various local hospital and medical associations, and 
fifty-six Chicago hospitals.8 A verdict in favor of the plaintiffs could 
have imposed substantial sanctions on the hospitals (e.g., treble 
damages for the perhaps lifetime earnings of more than 300 black 
Chicago physicians or possibly more than a billion dollars). This 
threat, along with pressure from Mayor Daley, resulted in the creation 
of a special committee of hospital leaders and an out-of-court 
 
5. Interview with Dr. Quentin Young (June 14, 1997) (recording available 
in the Temple University Library). 
6. See DAVID B. SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A 
NATION 200-03 (1999). 
7. See generally NATHANIEL WESLEY, BLACK HOSPITALS IN AMERICA: 
HISTORY, CONTRIBUTIONS AND DEMISE (2010). 
8. Chicago Physicians Sue for Admission to Hospital Staffs, 53 J. NAT’L 
MED. ASS’N 198 (1961). 
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accommodation that assured privileges for about 120 black physicians 
admitting them at one of the historically white hospitals in Chicago.9  
B. The Integration of the Veteran’s Administration Hospitals 
Beginning with the Truman Administration, the executive branch 
had achieved small victories in battles desegregating hospitals even in 
well-entrenched bastions of segregation by threatening to withhold 
federal funding. The federal power of the purse was first applied in 
eliminating segregation in Veteran’s Administration (VA) facilities, 
then to medical schools seeking National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
funding, and, finally in an important legal precedent, to voluntary 
hospitals receiving funds under the Hill-Burton Act of 1946. These 
accomplishments went largely unnoticed but they still played an 
important role in setting the stage for the struggle to force 
desegregation of all hospitals with the implementation of Medicare.  
In 1948, President Harry S. Truman ordered both an end to 
segregation in the armed services and discrimination in federal 
employment.10 These orders forced the eventual desegregation of all of 
the nation’s VA hospitals. The battle over the construction of a new 
VA hospital in Jackson, Mississippi in 1956 demonstrated how 
accommodations were worked out even in one of the most rigidly 
enforced Jim Crow communities in the nation. The old, now 
desegregated VA hospital in Jackson, was overcrowded and in need of 
replacement. At the behest of veterans’ groups, the Mississippi 
legislature passed a bill in 1954 donating state land for the new VA 
hospital. The federal government had approved approximately $15 
million ($133 million in 2014 dollars) for the project.11 When the 
Jackson White Citizens Council discovered that the new facility 
located on donated state land would be racially integrated, they 
persuaded a Mississippi legislator to submit a bill to rescind the state 
land offer. Veterans’ groups objected. As one veteran noted, “the 
integration controversy has unfortunately overshadowed the real 
question and that is whether or not our state, by cooperating on this 
project, is going to give its veterans like ourselves a chance to get 
adequate treatment without having to go so far from home that our 
families could never visit.”12 Besides, this spokesman argued, it is not 
“real” integration because “the wards are so constructed as to provide 
each patient his own room or cubicle, which is completely enclosed 
 
9. Interview with Dr. Quentin Young (June 14, 1997) (recording available 
in the Temple University Library); Smith, supra note 6, at 50-53. 
10. See Exec. Order No. 9980 & 9981, 3 C.F.R. § 145 (1949). 
11. David Barton Smith, The Politics of Disparities: Desegregating the 
Hospitals in Jackson, Mississippi, 83 MILBANK Q. 247, 255 (2005). 
12. Id. 
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and affords him as much privacy as he could expect in any hospital.”13 
In the end, the dollars and the benefits to veterans and Jackson as a 
whole trumped abstract principles about a “southern way of life.” The 
cornerstone for a fully integrated new hospital was laid in 1960 on the 
donated state land. Consequently, in many southern communities 
such as Jackson, VA hospitals became small islands of integration in 
otherwise rigidly enforced Jim Crow environments. Local officials 
looked the other way in order to ensure access to health care for 
veterans and to receive the economic benefits that such facilities 
provided to communities. 
C. The Integration of the Medical School Hospitals 
Kennedy, using Truman’s executive orders as a model, promised 
during his 1960 presidential campaign to end discrimination in 
federally supported housing “with the stroke of a pen.”14 Kennedy, 
however, delayed for almost two years signing such an order. As he 
soon discovered, ending any federal support of discrimination was a 
politically hazardous undertaking. In winning the 1960 presidential 
election, Kennedy had assembled a coalition of blacks and southern 
whites. He won the election with 49.7 percent to Nixon’s 49.5 percent, 
the narrowest margin of victory in U.S. history up to that time. Had 
Kennedy not secured the black vote, Nixon would have won 52 
percent of the popular vote, carried both Illinois and Michigan, and 
won the election. Equally essential to Kennedy’s election was the 
support of the largely Democratic “solid South.” Thus, southern 
Democratic legislators’ resistance to integration made the passage of 
his promised civil rights legislation in Congress impossible.  
Nor could Kennedy easily extend desegregation by executive order 
to states and other nonfederal entities receiving federal funding as 
Truman had done for federal agencies. Any executive order blocking 
the use of federal funds to entities that were discriminatory would be 
challenged and Kennedy would lose the Southern voters he needed for 
reelection. No federal laws prohibited the distribution of federal 
funding to private and state segregated hospitals. Indeed, the Hill-
Burton Act of 1946 providing construction funding for private 
hospitals specifically permitted the funding of segregated facilities.15 
 
13. Id. 
14. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTY WITH WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 
1954-1963, at 587-588 (1988). 
15. Hospital Survey and Reconstruction Act (Hill-Burton), Pub. L. No. 79-
725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1040, 1043 (providing an exception to the 
nondiscrimination requirement “in cases where separate hospital 
facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the [state] plan 
makes equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and services 
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Since the late 1940s, Adam Clayton Powell, a Congressman from 
Harlem, had tried to undo the Hill-Burton precedent by submitting 
the “Powell Amendment,” prohibiting, in whatever bill was being 
considered, funding to any entity that discriminated.16 These 
amendments were routinely defeated and, as a result, only served to 
add further legitimacy to the Hill-Burton precedent.  
Thus, discretion became the better part of valor and the 
introduction of Kennedy’s promised civil rights bill was delayed for 
more than two years. During this period, the Kennedy Administration 
sought to placate the civil rights activists by subtler and more 
indirect means; still, the pressure on Kennedy increased. A widely 
circulated report by the Civil Rights Leadership Conference 
documented the “pervasiveness of the American tax payers’ 
subsidization of racial injustice . . . . With few exceptions, there is no 
federal policy or machinery to assure that these funds, paid for by all 
taxpayers alike, will be used in a non-discriminatory manner. On the 
contrary, it would be hard to overestimate the significance of these 
funds as support for the continuation of segregation and 
discrimination.”17 The report estimated that $8 billion ($62 billion in 
2014 dollars) in grants in aid would flow to state and local 
governments in 1962 and more than $3 billion ($23 billion in 2014 
dollars) would flow in the form of scholarships, fellowships, and grants 
to hospitals, universities, and research institutions.18 Federal grants in 
aid accounted for more than 21 percent of all funds expended by the 
states of Alabama and Mississippi.19 The report further noted, “it is 
ironic that tax payers for those states where the national policy of non-
discrimination is observed make a disproportionately larger per capita 
financial contribution to these federal programs; tax payers in states 
where the national policy of non-discrimination is flouted receive a 
disproportionately larger per capita share of the benefits.”20 
An interagency task force set up to study the problem 
acknowledged the validity of the civil rights group’s criticism. A 
Department of Health and Welfare (DHEW) staff study completed in 
January of 1961 tried to identify possible opportunities for executive 
 
of like quality for each such group”), invalidated by Simkins v. Cone, 
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). 
16. CHARLES V. HAMILTON & ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, JR., THE POLITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 226 (1991). 
17. C.R. LEADERSHIP CONF., The Wikinson-Aaronson Report: Proposal for 
Executive Action to End Federally Supported Segregation and Other 
Forms of Discrimination 8 (August 20, 1961). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 9. 
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action. However, the exercise was attacked as hopelessly flawed by 
DHEW’s general counsel who argued that DHEW had no authority 
whatsoever to withhold funds on the basis of discrimination without 
explicit authorization in the legislation or explicit rejection of the 
constitutionality of parts of legislation that permitted “separate but 
equal” use of federal funds.21 
Yet, both medicine and hospitals had benefited from a post-war 
boom in federal funding. The Hill-Burton Act of 1946 provided 
approximately $22 billion (2014 dollars) in federal funds over the next 
twenty years for hospital construction.22 Local and state matching 
funds increased the total to $70 billion for more than 8,300 projects 
providing more than 353,500 hospital and nursing home beds.23 The 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) appropriations for medical 
research expanded rapidly during this same period from $43 million in 
1947 to more than $7.3 billion in 1966.24 These were fondly 
remembered as “the golden years” of NIH expansion and the vast 
majority of these funds flowed to medical schools and medical school 
hospitals. The expanding health-related flow of federal funds became a 
focus of attention of the emerging civil rights movement.  
NIH funding offered a relatively easy, surreptitious way to put 
pressure on medical schools and their hospitals to desegregate. The 
growing flow of NIH funding ceded control over their allocation to the 
review processes of the scientific community.25 As a result, research 
grant peer review committees, through a combination of subtle 
guidance, selection, and predilections, made it clear to medical schools 
that they had to choose between Jim Crow practices and federal 
research funding.  
This choice put university medical centers in states with local Jim 
Crow laws in an awkward bind. The solution for many was to 
integrate but not tell anybody about it. This was apparently the case 
for the University of North Carolina Hospital System that, along with 
 
21. Memorandum from James Quigley, Assistant Sec’y of Health, Welfare, 
and Educ., to Harris Wofford, Legal Assistant to President John 
Kennedy (July 6, 1961) (noting that “[t]he language of [the Hill-Burton 
Act] makes it clear that Congress intended to allow Federal monies to 
be spent in ways which would condone discrimination on the basis of 
race.”). 
22. Highlights of the Hill Burton Program, 81 PUB. HEALTH REP. 684 (1966). 
23. Id. 
24. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES 
OF HEALTH (2014), available at 
http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_06.html. 
25. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 343 
(1982). 
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local civil rights groups, quietly arranged to integrate in order to 
avoid the possible loss of federal funding support. According to Dr. 
Charles Watts, a key black medical leader in the state:  
We filed a suit against the University of North Carolina when I 
was President of the Old North State Medical Society 
(ONSMS). We got a student at A&T and two others admitted 
to the psychiatric unit at UNC. A state senator over the 
weekend had gotten drunk, had the DTs and was admitted to 
the desegregated unit. When he woke up he demanded that the 
hospital get [the black patients] out. So the University told 
them they would have to leave. Two had to be sent to West 
Virginia for care. The state Civil Rights Commission was having 
a hearing in 1961. I represented the ONSMS at the hearing and 
I described the situation. The head UNC psychiatrist said it had 
nothing to do with race, they had just found that they couldn’t 
treat black and white patients in the same setting. I said, ‘Well, 
we’re going to let the courts decide.’ The chairman of the 
Commission called me after the meeting. He asked if I thought 
it would be satisfactory for ONSMS to withdraw the complaint, 
if the medical center just quietly integrated. He said it would 
hurt the University and hurt them in getting grants if we made 
a big public to-do about it or published the fact that we had 
made the University change its policies. I said, ‘we’re not out to 
hurt the University, and it will cost us more in legal fees. If you 
send me a letter to that effect, I will present it to my 
committee.’ That’s what they did; they sent us a letter saying 
that racial discrimination would no longer be allowed in the 
University Hospital System. They didn’t relate it to our suit at 
all. Floyd McKissick was our lawyer. He advised us to accept it 
and keep the University Hospital System under observation. We 
filed the letter. If anybody came up with a complaint, we could 
trot it out. I think it cost us $200 to integrate the whole 
hospital system. This took place in 1962. Our purpose was to 
get change, not to stir up controversy.26 
Dr. Charles Johnson, who would later serve as President of the 
NMA from 1990-91, went to Duke in 1964 for a fellowship in 
endocrinology, just as the school was beginning to integrate. He faced 
a similar confrontation over NIH funding at the division level and 
quietly prevailed. 
 
I was told by the division chief that he didn’t want me 
going on the private side because some of the physicians 
 
26. Interview with Dr. Charles Watts (1996) (recording available in the 
Temple University Library). 
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were concerned about the reaction of their patients. I felt I 
was signed on under false pretenses. It turned out that the 
Division was trying to get a Biometrics Lab funded by NIH. 
Dr. Fine from the University of Michigan and two others 
were on the site visit. They questioned the endocrine 
fellows. We were all sitting at the table, all nine. At the end 
of the session, Dr. Fine asked, ‘Are any of you unhappy 
about the training you have received?’ I said, ‘Yes I am. I 
have been told that I can’t rotate on the private side 
because of my color.’ He said, ‘What did you say?’ I said, ‘I 
have been told that I can’t rotate on the private side 
because of my color.’ He said, ‘Well, we’ll see about that!’ 
The other fellows came to my support. I hadn’t known what 
they felt before. Any ways, the senior faculty and chief of 
the division followed the fellows. The first question asked 
the chief of the division was, ‘Why can’t Dr. Johnson rotate 
on the private side of the hospital?’ No answer. I never 
heard the inner working of what did and didn’t get said 
after that but I’m certain a lot of money got tied up in the 
discussion. Ed Horton who was doing research related to 
transplanting diabetics and who is now at Harvard called 
me and said, ‘I think you better stay away from here until 
the dust settles.’ Finally, the chief, met with me. He had 
lost his voice by the way, he could not talk for several 
days—race relations is always a touchy question and if it’s 
the first question it creates a state of shock. The man really 
lost his voice. He says, ‘Dr. Johnson, do you really want to 
rotate on the private service?’ . . . . I rotated. Clearly they 
accepted the money and me too. Otherwise, they would 
have lost a large sum of government money. It wasn’t that 
they wanted me so bad, they wanted the money more. They 
needed a big stick waved over their heads.27  
 
Even the well-funded state enforcer of segregation, the Mississippi 
Sovereignty Commission, had to concede in a chess game that began 
to be played out in the 1960s over the future of the University of the 
Mississippi Medical Center in Jackson.28 Dr. Robert Marston, a former 
Rhodes Scholar who later served as NIH director, was director and 
dean of the Medical Center at this time. Marston and other recruits 
had little sympathy with the Sovereignty Commission’s mission. 
 
27. Interview with Dr. Charles Johnson (1996) (recording available in the 
Temple University Library). 
28. David B. Smith, The Politics of Racial Disparities: Desegregating the 
Hospitals in Jackson, Mississippi, MILBANK Q. 256-260 (2005). 
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Instead, they were concerned with building the reputation of the 
medical school and hospital. Following its usual procedures, the 
Sovereignty Commission sent detectives to investigate complaints 
made by whites regarding integration efforts. For example, in 1960, a 
nurse had complained that a personnel director and nurses in charge 
were all from the North and that these nurses had compelled white 
nurses to work on “colored” floors and black nurses to work on white 
floors. Additionally, the nurse alleged that the elevator operators were 
now all black and were allowing black visitors to ride the same 
elevators as white visitors. Another informant complained that one of 
the doctors at the center had been lecturing at medical schools around 
the world and that some of the students from these schools that had 
visited the medical center in Jackson were black. In 1964 a 
Sovereignty Commission detective had reported that segregation at 
the medical center was on the verge of collapse. The parking lots were 
integrated and the white and colored patients used the same waiting 
room in the X-ray department. “Since there is only one cobalt 
machine and all the X-rays are adjacent to the waiting room. I do not 
know how the hospital authorities can remedy this congestion of the 
mixing of Negroes and Whites, except through expansion.”29 
The obstetrics and pediatric service at the Mississippi Medical 
Center were a particular source of concern to the investigator. There 
was one labor room with eight beds used for both black and white 
women, and they all used the same four delivery rooms. After their 
deliveries, the black mothers were placed on a separate floor, but their 
babies remained on the same floor in a segregated nursery next to the 
nursery for white babies and near where the white mothers were 
placed. On the pediatric floor, children of both races shared a 
common area and playroom. The black and white patients were not 
supposed to use the playroom at the same time, although staff 
admitted that this rule was seldom enforced. The investigator aptly 
summarized the dilemma that the Medical Center posed for the 
protection of Mississippi’s “sovereignty”:  
The University Hospital is a very fine institution and composed 
of some of the best doctors and instructors in the Nation and is 
a credit to the State of Mississippi. Mississippi people are proud 
of the University Hospital, but there are no doubts in my mind 
but that improvements can be brought about at the University 
to improve on the creeping integration which is in evidence out 
there. I am sure it will cost the state extra money, but 
 
29. Id. at 257. 
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Mississippi should by all means provide the extra cash needed 
to maintain proper segregation at University Hospital.30 
In other words, if the state was really committed to preserving 
segregation, it should pay for it. In early 1964, the U.S. Army Medical 
Research and Development Commission had advised the University 
that it would have to comply with the federal executive orders 
banning segregation. Dean Marston made clear to the Director of the 
Sovereignty Commission that this would be just the beginning of 
similar compliance orders from other federal agencies that would 
involve the loss of at least $5.3 million in federal support ($41 million 
in 2014 dollars).31 In its report to the governor, the Sovereignty 
Commission outlined the options that might be considered: 
Since it is inconceivable at this time that the State Legislature 
would be in a position to supplement the appropriations for the 
Medical Center and replace the federal funds flowing to the 
Center or in the available future . . . . In a way this leaves us in 
a somewhat untenable position. We can yield and assure 
continuance of the funds, which would be against our policies, 
we could advise the army [that] we cannot comply with the 
request and lose the army research grant; we could continue the 
present segregated facility policies and take the chance that 
many months or years would transpire before each of the 
various agencies served similar notice about the facilities; or we 
could write off all the federal funds for the Medical Center and 
seek some method of replacing these funds with either state or 
private money or both.32  
The state of Mississippi opted to take the money. The 
Sovereignty Commission suggested some convoluted ways to eliminate 
visible symbols of segregation while possibly preserving “voluntary” 
segregation. These suggestions appear to have been ignored by the 
Medical Center.  
The desegregation of medical school hospitals followed a pattern 
that would later be repeated for the health system as a whole. The 
first targets of desegregation in medical school hospitals were the 
units most medicalized and insulated from public scrutiny—the newly 
created intensive care units. These units were set up in medical school 
hospitals in the early 1960s in order to provide better care for 
critically ill patients. At the University of North Carolina Medical 
Center, an early special care unit had one room with three beds while 
 
30. Id. at 258. 
31. Id. at 259. 
32. Id. 
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another room had four beds. Nurses were supposed to move the 
patients from one room to the other to keep the races separate. This 
meant extra work for the nurses and would sometimes compromise 
care. Cookie Wilson, a nurse who had a long career at the medical 
center, recalled in 2002: “I was just a rotating staff nurse at the time, 
but I got tired of that. It was ridiculous. So, I did not move them. I 
integrated the unit.” No family complaints and no hospital reprimand 
followed. “Nobody opened their mouth.”33  
Dr. Chris Hansen, a white physician in Mississippi and a 
participant in the civil rights movement, served on a Hospital 
Compliance Committee and offered a similar story about the 
University of Mississippi Medical Center. Hansen met with its 
director, Dr. Robert Marston. Marston assured him that the Medical 
Center was making slow but steady progress. Marston said, “I know it 
is slow, but [I] want to tell you as a measure of our good faith that we 
have our first integrated ward and I’m going to take you up and show 
it to you.” He took them upstairs and showed them and, there indeed, 
was a four-bed male ward with four patients: two African Americans, 
a white man, and a Native American. All four of them were 
unconscious. They had achieved their first step at integration with 
four people in a coma.34 Neither the comatose ICU patients nor their 
families, focused as they were on the survival of their loved one, were 
going to pay much attention to who was in the bed next to them. In 
addition, from the hospital’s standpoint, the cost of creating two 
separate ICUs, no matter its racial views, was hard to justify.  
D. Using Federal Funds to Integrate All Hospitals 
By the end of 1965 most the medical school hospitals in the Jim 
Crow South were well on the way toward being fully integrated. In 
most cases, this had been done secretly with many denying any 
change in policies. While the changes had been facilitated by 
supportive medical school deans and university administrators, it was 
the threat of the loss of federal funding and the budget crisis it 
presented to the universities and states that ultimately silenced the 
segregationist opposition. Yet, medical school hospitals represented 
only a small fraction of the nation’s hospitals and federal research 
dollars offered little leverage over the rest.  
Federal Hill-Burton funding, however, offered potential leverage 
over these other hospitals. It also was the key to unlocking federal 
 
33. Dick Broom, The First ICU:  The Earliest Critically Ill Patients Found 
Intensive Care at UNC, UNIV.  N. C. (2002) (published as part of a press 
packet for the fiftieth aniversary celebration of the North Carolina 
Memorial Hospital) (on file with the author). 
34. Interview by Barbara Berney with Jack Geiger (2013) (notes on file with 
the author). 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
The “Golden Rules” for Eliminating Disparities: Title VI, Medicare, and 
the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
46 
power to block the flow of federal funding to all discriminatory 
programs and institutions. Inserted in the 1946 Hill-Burton Act by 
Senator Lister Hill (Democrat from Alabama) was the requirement 
that hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funding provide “assurances” that 
their facility would be  
made available to all persons resident in the territorial area of 
the applicant without discrimination on account of race, creed 
or color, but an exception shall be made in cases where separate 
hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if 
the plan makes equitable provision on the basis of need for 
facilities and services of like quality for each such group.35  
This exception is the only acknowledgment of federal financial 
support of segregation (i.e. separate but equal) in federal laws enacted 
in the twentieth century. As such, Hill-Burton effectively barred the 
executive branch from withholding federal funds to private 
institutions and programs that discriminated.  
The “assurances” required that hospitals receiving Hill-Burton 
funding be open to all people regardless of race; however, black 
medical civil rights activists soon discovered that these “assurances” 
were worth less than the paper they were written on. Dr. Brenda 
Armstrong, now on the faculty of Duke University’s medical school, 
recalled the experiences of her father, Dr. Wiley T. Armstrong, a 
physician in Rocky Mount, North Carolina during this period and his 
struggle to overcome the indifference to discrimination on the part of 
the federal government: 
My first memory of medical practice was going with Dad to 
deliver a baby in someone’s home. He took me to help him stay 
awake. My sister and I were born at home. The hospital would 
not accept black patients. We had a birthing room in my house. 
My brother was born in 1956 with CP because he was too big 
and needed a C-section. Although my mother was the wife of a 
physician, she could not be admitted to the hospital, even 
though my father pleaded with them. It was too late and risky 
to transport her all the way to the “Colored Ward” at Duke. As 
a result he was born at home vaginally, had a stroke and CP 
because of it. He could have been the brightest and most 
accomplished of us all.36  
 
35. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(e), 60 
Stat. 1040, 1043 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) 
(2014)) (emphasis added). 
36. See Smith, supra note 6, at 32; Duke University Medical School, Part 2: 
Trailblazer, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2013), 
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Dr. Wiley Armstrong, along with two other key North Carolina 
civil rights medical activists, Drs. Eaton and Watts, traveled to 
Washington, D.C. in November of 1961. As representatives of North 
Carolina’s black medical society, they sought federal intervention to 
assure that the “assurances” provided by hospitals receiving Hill-
Burton funding were honored. The U.S. attorney general’s office had 
previously declined to offer an opinion on the provision. The visit 
with the DHEW officials was equally discouraging. The “assurances” 
of nondiscrimination on the part of applicants for these funds “had 
never been questioned. There was no procedure for checking on the 
validity of the ‘assurances,’ nor was there any authorized course of 
action for violations. It did not appear that the Department 
considered it in its province to know what went on in hospitals after 
grants had been made nor was it anxious to become involved in this 
area.”37  
Dr. Armstrong and his colleagues, however, did get a reminder of 
the importance of their mission to Washington. On their arrival at 
National Airport, they managed to hail down a cab. After they 
climbed in, the black female cab driver turned around, smiled and 
said, 
“How you, Dr. Armstrong!” 
“Sugar, you know me?” Armstrong answered in surprise. 
“‘Yeah,” the cabby answered. “I’m from Rocky Mount. You 
delivered me.”38 
In May of 1962, the pressure brought by the North Carolina civil 
rights activists in concert with a national campaign finally began to 
bear fruit. Two white only hospitals in Greensboro, North Carolina 
had received substantial Hill-Burton funds. Private hospitals had been 
considered immune from the Brown v. Board of Education decision 
since they were not public institutions. However hospitals that 
received Hill-Burton funds also participated in a state plan for 
allocating those funds. And as the plaintiffs in the Simkins v. Moses 
Cone Hospital case had argued, these hospitals were “an arm of the 
state” thus triggering the Brown decision prohibiting public 
institutions from engaging in so called separate but equal treatment.39 
 
37. Integration Battlefront, Executive Procedure Without Effect in Hospital 
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Using this argument, Dr. George Simkins joined a group of local black 
physicians and, with the assistance of the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, challenged the constitutionality of the Hill-Burton provision 
and thus the right of the two hospitals to exclude black admissions.40 
While they lost the case in the District Court of North Carolina, they 
gained the intervention of the Justice Department on their behalf in 
on appeal.41 In a telegram to Dr. Montague Cobb, the convener of 
what would end up being the last conference organized (May 1962) to 
press for action in desegregating the nation’s hospitals, President 
Kennedy noted: 
I am sure you are aware that the attorney general has 
intervened in a federal court case, arguing that the clause 
sanctioning segregation in the Hill-Burton Act is 
unconstitutional. I am hopeful, as I know you are, that this 
action will speed the day when we will recognize that we cannot 
afford to squander our resources on the practice of racial 
discrimination and that the availability of hospital services will 
not depend on the race, color or creed of the patient.42  
The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs but the 
hospitals appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.43 In February 
of 1964, the Supreme Court promptly declined to review the decision 
leaving intact the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. 
The timing of all of this was fortuitous but hardly coincidental. In 
June of 1963, Kennedy, forced by the violent reactions to civil rights 
protests, finally introduced his civil rights bill. Echoing the arguments 
made two years earlier by the Civil Rights Leadership Council and 
shadowing the intervention of the U.S. attorney general in the 
Simkins case more than a year earlier, Kennedy argued, “Simple 
justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races 
contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, 
subsidizes or results in racial discrimination.”44 The New York Times 
noted that the prompt decision by the Supreme Court not to review 
Simkins  
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was made while the whole issue that was partly involved in 
the lower court decision was pending in the 
Administration’s equal rights bill on which the Senate had 
not even begun to debate . . . . It must be concluded that 
the Court was fully aware that its timing in the case would 
cut the ground away from the effort in the Senate to 
maintain in Title VI the exemptions authorized in the Hill 
Burton Act . . .  In sum, the Court departed from the usual 
by ruling, not that a statute passed by Congress was 
unconstitutional, but that a proposal about to be taken up 
would be if legislated.45 
 
The Civil Rights Act passed in June of 1964 after the longest 
filibuster in Senate history. Title VI survived without the Hill-Burton 
exemptions, but it left much in doubt about how or even if this 
section of the law would ever be implemented. 
In the first year and a half after its enactment, the prospects for 
Title VI did not seem promising. What constituted noncompliance 
was vague and ill defined. No staff was allocated to enforce it. No 
investigative tools (reporting requirements, subpoena powers, etc.) 
were available and no credible sanctions could be imposed. Even 
though civil rights groups had submitted hundreds of complaints 
against hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funding that federal officials 
acknowledged were legitimate, nothing happened. DHEW focused 
most of its efforts on trying to get voluntary compliance, but it was 
not working.  
II. Enforcing Title VI in Medicare and Medicaid 
The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in July of 1965 altered 
the federal government’s leverage. Participating hospitals could now 
collect from these new federal programs cost plus reimbursement for 
patients that they had often received no payment from before. Care 
to the elderly and the indigent that had threatened their solvency 
now guaranteed it. In 1967, the first full year of operation, 32 percent 
of participating hospital revenues would flow from Medicare and 
Medicaid. This would soon rise to over 50 percent. In the first full 
year of operation, hospitals received $5.6 billion from Medicare and 
Medicaid (the total amount that hospitals receive from these two 
public sources now exceeds $500 billion). Few hospitals could afford to 
refuse to be part of this immense new funding stream. For most, it 
was a choice between new affluence and bankruptcy. By participating 
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TIMES, Mar. 4, 1964, at 32. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
The “Golden Rules” for Eliminating Disparities: Title VI, Medicare, and 
the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
50 
in Medicare and Medicaid, private hospitals that once had been 
insulated from pressure to desegregate were now insulated from state 
and local political pressures opposed to desegregation. Indeed, their 
private boards had a fiduciary responsibility for protecting their 
charitable assets. Those with the new gold, it would seem, were free 
to extract whatever concessions they demanded. 
It was, of course, not that simple. Many questions regarding 
enforcement remained. For instance, what constituted compliance 
with Title VI? Discrimination was not defined in the Civil Rights Act. 
Would the lack of a definition of discrimination liken the Civil Rights 
Act to the vague and meaningless “assurances” inserted in the Hill-
Burton Act? There were no reporting requirements on the part of 
recipients of federal funding and no federal resources allocated for 
staffing enforcement. Aggrieved parties could submit complaints to 
DHEW but how could they know that they had actually been 
discriminated against? Furthermore, what could DHEW do about 
these complaints? The Office of Equal Health Opportunity (OEHO), 
the agency responsible for ensuring Title VI compliance in Medicare, 
had been established just four months before the implementation of 
Medicare. It had a staff of six. Indeed, some of the same southern 
Senators that had filibustered Title VI had assured that its 
enforcement would be toothless and that OEHO would remain 
without a budget.  
Those in the Social Security Administration responsible for 
implementing Medicare were unlikely civil rights heroes. They needed 
the trust and collaboration of hospitals and physicians. Using 
Medicare to enforce Title VI had never been part of their game plan.46 
The American Medical Association (AMA) and many state and local 
medical societies had fought against its passage and the hospital 
associations and their leaders had been late and reluctant supporters. 
In addition, there had been no discussion of Title VI by anyone 
during the drafting of the Medicare and Medicaid Acts or in the 
debate over their passage in Congress. Everyone—including southern 
legislative supporters of Medicare and Medicaid—assumed that an 
accommodation would be made similar to the “assurances” in the 
Hill-Burton Act.  
Such a conclusion was supported by the decision early in the 
implementation process to exempt Medicare Part B—the part that 
paid for physician services through a voluntary, federally subsidized 
plan—by defining Part B of Medicare as a “contract of insurance” 
with its subscribers rather than a direct grant of public funds. Indeed, 
contracts of insurance were specifically exempted from Title VI 
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requirements.47 As a result, a hospital could pass Title VI certification 
and, through the racially exclusionary admission practices of its 
medical staff, remain segregated. This offered a loophole equivalent to 
the Hill-Burton Act “assurances.” 
In addition, an early use of Title VI to withhold funding from the 
Chicago public schools in the Fall of 1965 suggested that the Johnson 
Administration would not have the stomach for an all out battle over 
Title VI compliance in Medicare. In Chicago, civil rights leaders had 
demanded that DHEW block the allocation of $32 million in new 
federal funds for Chicago’s public schools on Title VI grounds. 
Secretary Gardner, following the usual procedure, had delayed the 
release of this funding pending an investigation of these complaints. 
Mayor Daley protested directly to President Johnson. Johnson sent 
Under Secretary Wilbur Cohen to Chicago the next day to 
immediately release the funds while getting “assurances” that the 
public school officials would “look into the complaints.”48 Cohen was 
one of the central figures involved in the implementation of Medicare.  
Given Johnson’s reluctance to fight in the Chicago schools’ Title 
VI dispute, no one could have anticipated the dramatic change that 
occurred in hospitals across the United States after the passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid. In less than four months, OEHO inspectors 
visited approximately three thousand hospitals. Two thousand 
hospitals changed their policies in anticipation of these inspections 
and another thousand were brought into compliance with Title VI 
after subsequent follow-ups. Compliance went far beyond simply 
signing a form professing good intentions or simply removing the 
white and colored signs as had happened with the Chicago schools. 
No self-segregation was permitted, either in the assignment of patients 
to multiple occupancy rooms or in outpatient and emergency waiting 
rooms. The actual behavior of staff and patients could not reflect 
racial preferences. If self-segregation was taking place in waiting 
 
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 605, 78 Stat. 241, 253. 
This exclusion in the law was designed to allay the fears of some 
senators from the South that Title VI, because of the federal insurance 
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concession irrelevant. See generally Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 
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48. EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, MR. SOCIAL SECURITY: THE LIFE OF WILBUR J. 
COHEN 248-49 (1995); JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA:  AN 
INSIDER’S REPORT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CABINET 221-23 
(1981). 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
The “Golden Rules” for Eliminating Disparities: Title VI, Medicare, and 
the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
52 
rooms or other parts of the hospital, the hospital was required to 
redesign these spaces to prevent it. In less than four months, private 
hospitals in the United States went from the nation’s most segregated 
private institutions to its most integrated.  
The longer-term impact was equally dramatic. Within a decade, 
most of the usage rate patterns turned upside down with use 
becoming inversely related to income and blacks using more rather 
than less hospital services than whites. For the first time, usage rates 
began to reflect the medical needs of patients.49 Furthermore, for the 
first twenty years after the implementation of Medicare, racial 
disparities in health outcomes decreased.50 The physical structure of 
care also changed. The charity wards disappeared and indigent clinics 
became indistinguishable from private medical offices. Most of the 
black hospitals and public charity hospitals were closed or converted 
to other purposes.  
In the current national political gridlock, it is hard to imagine 
such a profound transformation taking place so quickly. Indeed, at 
least in terms of civil rights issues, the political gridlock that existed 
at the time of the implementation of Medicare was more than a 
match for the current one. It had existed for almost a century. A 
more detailed description of the sequence of events is provided 
elsewhere.51 The events, however, do not explain why it happened. 
Explanations that attribute it all to the qualities of leadership of the 
major actors or to just fortuitous accidents are not very convincing 
either. I argue that four necessary conditions made it possible: (1) a 
grassroots movement, (2) visible adversaries and an invisible army of 
supporters, (3) both versions of the Golden Rule, and (4) multiple 
barriers to political interference. 
A. A Grassroots Movement 
Nothing would have happened without a grassroots movement. As 
the civil rights movement demonstrated, powerlessness exists only 
through the consent of the powerless. People can always vote with 
 
49. See Smith, supra note 6, at 203. 
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their feet. That began with the individual decisions of those in the 
Jim Crow South seeking a better life that produced the Great 
Migration.52 The black migrants now concentrated in northern cities 
gained political power, first achieving victory at the national level in 
Kennedy’s election, and then again in Johnson’s election. The 
emerging black middle class in Southern cities, often led by black 
physicians and dentists insulated from retaliation by the local white 
power structure, began to vote with their feet with bus boycotts, 
lunch counter sit-ins, and lawsuits targeting segregated schools and 
medical facilities. By the mid-1960s, this grassroots movement had 
become a transformative force in every region of the country. 
B. Visible Adversaries and an Invisible Army 
Segregated hospitals were a highly visible adversary just as the 
imagery of the beatings of the Freedom Riders and the police dogs 
attacking demonstrators helped create the national consensus 
necessary to spur federal action against segregation. Since segregated 
hospitals were easy to identify, they were easy to enforce corrections 
against. Moreover, that enforcement effort had at its disposal an 
immense invisible army of supporters. DHEW Secretary Gardner 
called for temporary volunteers to staff the Title VI inspection 
process, thus transforming DHEW into a civil rights enforcement 
agency. About one thousand individuals volunteered for this 
assignment, and their salaries and travel costs were borne by their 
home agency.53 Many of these temporary transfers were individuals 
already active in the civil rights movement. Fifty medical students 
with similar commitments were hired for summer jobs in DHEW to 
assist with the inspections. The inspections and enforcement were 
carried out quietly, even secretly, surprising congressmen and senators 
when their constituent hospitals brought the presence of these 
inspectors to their attention. Local civil rights organizations and 
hospital workers also participated in this invisible army. The 
boundaries between local civil rights activists and the volunteer staff 
of OEHO blurred, making it impossible for hospitals to conceal 
anything or shift back to segregated accommodations after the 
inspectors had left. 
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C. Both Versions of the Golden Rule 
The OEHO inspectors insisted that the hospitals had chosen to 
participate in Medicare and, in the process of applying to be a 
provider, had agreed to provide services without regard to race. All 
the inspectors were doing, they argued, was to help the hospitals do 
what they had already promised to do. Similarly, patients were free to 
choose to go to a segregated hospital—Medicare simply would not pay 
for it. “Freedom of choice” to be in a segregated wing or clinic did not 
apply once one had decided to go to a participating Medicare facility. 
All this was doing was insisting that others be treated just as you 
would like to be treated yourself (i.e. the ethical version of the Golden 
Rule). It captured the notion of “social solidarity,” often used as an 
explanation for universal health coverage in other countries but rarely 
invoked in the United States.  
The economic version of the Golden Rule, of course, also applied. 
All but about one hundred hospitals out of more than six thousand 
otherwise eligible applied to be Medicare providers. It was striking 
how responsive private hospitals could be, especially since they were 
not noted for responding to outside pressure from the federal 
government or from anyone else. For example, local civil rights 
activists had reported to OEHO that the Louisiana Red Cross Blood 
Supply was segregated into “white” and “colored” blood. The OEHO 
staff member receiving this report sent a telegram to the Louisiana 
Hospital Association director without conferring with legal counsel 
and in a manner that certainly exceeded the intent of Title VI as it 
was to be applied to hospital Medicare participation. He informed the 
director that none of the hospitals in Louisiana would be eligible to be 
Medicare providers until the blood supply was desegregated. The 
hospitals in Louisiana did not waste any time bringing the Louisiana 
Red Cross Blood Bank program into compliance. In a matter of hours 
the blood supply in Louisiana was desegregated.54 In a classic example 
of the economic version of the Golden Rule, Marshal Hospital—the 
only one in Lady Byrd Johnson’s home county in Texas—had resisted 
desegregation, providing a potential embarrassment for President 
Johnson. Dr. Richard Smith, serving as a part-time troubleshooter for 
OEHO, was sent to try to persuade them to comply. Nothing would 
budge the hospital administrator who insisted that the hospital would 
never desegregate. “Fine,” Smith said finally, “but you just tossed 
away $100 million in Medicare funding.”55 About a week later, Smith 
received a call from the chairman of the hospital’s board. “The 
trustees have just fired the administrator and want to know what 
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they have to do to get the Medicare money.”56 Those with the gold—
now the American taxpayers—ruled.  
D. Multiple Barriers to Political Interference 
In part by accident and in part by design, the process of certifying 
hospitals for Medicare funding avoided the political interference that 
had undermined compliance with Title VI in the Chicago Public 
Schools. There, Mayor Daley had personally intervened and 
successfully demanded that President Johnson release the funds to the 
Chicago Public Schools blocked by Title VI challenges by civil rights 
groups. As recommended by Vice President Humphrey and endorsed 
by President Johnson in the Fall of 1965, the process of ensuring 
compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act was reorganized and 
decentralized. Those most directly involved and familiar with the 
programs and institutions receiving funding lower down in the federal 
bureaucracy were to be given full authority to ensure compliance.57 
This resulted in Secretary Gardner assigning the responsibility for 
Title VI certification to the newly created Office of Equal Health 
Opportunity (OHEO) in the Public Health Service. Gardner quietly 
assigned the temporary volunteer staff that would serve as Title VI 
investigators to OEHO. The public face of the Medicare 
implementation, however, included Robert Ball and the key members 
of his Social Security Administration team.58 The Social Security 
Administration was a large, experienced part of the federal 
bureaucracy, whose central planners were well respected by the 
leadership of both parties in Congress for their technical expertise. As 
a result, the President and Congress completely delegated authority 
and responsibility for the implementation of Medicare to Ball and his 
Social Security team. “I don’t think I can exaggerate the degree of 
this,” Ball would later reflect. “The thought from above was, ‘we are 
not going to try to, in any way, interfere with the agency’s sole 
responsibility to put this in effect.’”59  
Ball, under Gardner’s direction, proceeded to further delegate 
complete authority and responsibility for Title VI certification to 
OEHO. This had two benefits. The Social Security team, insulated 
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from the more messy and disagreeable business of Title VI 
certification, could focus on developing an essential, trusting, and 
collaborative partnership with the hospitals and medical associations 
in working out the financing and administrative details of Medicare. 
In turn, OEHO was free to serve its enforcement function 
unencumbered by orders from superiors. In essence, Social Security 
could play the role of the good cop while OEHO played the bad cop. 
The two operations were insulated from each other. Indeed, 
Commissioner Ball never even met the OEHO Director Robert Nash.60  
OEHO provided regular reports on the Title VI certification of 
hospitals up the chain of command: The reports were first sent to the 
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service; then to Secretary John 
Gardner and his Special Assistant for Civil Rights, Peter Libassi; then 
to Marvin Watson, President Johnson’s Chief of Staff; and finally to 
President Johnson. The reporting was informational and, as Ball had 
observed, virtually unencumbered by any directives flowing down the 
chain of command. Authority and responsibility were almost 
completely decentralized. In a few rare examples, the Johnson White 
House requested special attention to recalcitrant hospitals in Texas 
that could have embarrassed the President. While higher ups in the 
chain of command insisted that every effort be made to gain 
compliance, they maintained that it be done without compromise. 
The acid test would be when local civil rights groups acknowledged 
that the hospital had complied with Title VI.  
A looming and seemingly impossible deadline for the 
implementation of Medicare eliminated the prospect of resistance to 
Title VI enforcement. Higher ups in the executive branch did not 
have the time to second-guess the decisions of OEHO. Hospitals 
wanted the Medicare funds and they could not afford to be litigious. 
OEHO did not have time to negotiate with the hospitals even if 
OEHO had wanted to. Most legislators learned of the infusion of 
“volunteer” staffing and rigor of the enforcement effort only after it 
was too late.  
III. Lessons for the Implementation of the ACA 
Making Title VI compliance a condition for hospitals to receive 
funds as a Medicare provider produced profound changes. Yet, after 
the implementation of Medicare, Title VI proved a flawed vehicle for 
eliminating disparities in health care.61 Physicians were specifically 
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exempted from compliance. Managed care plans and related private 
insurance arrangements for publicly financed programs did not exist 
at the time Medicare was implemented and consequently they were 
never covered. Since physicians and health plans determine what care 
individuals receive and where they receive it, both have far more 
influence on health care disparities than hospitals.  
While Title VI prohibited discrimination in institutions and 
programs receiving federal funds, it failed to define discrimination. 
The guidelines developed by the Public Health Service for certifying 
hospitals to receive Medicare funds enumerated the obvious visible 
prohibitions (e.g., racial exclusionary staffing, deferring to the racial 
preferences of patients in room accommodations, etc.). Title VI 
regulations eventually identified two different kinds of discrimination: 
disparate treatment and disparate impact.62 While disparate 
treatment (e.g., refusal to treat a patient because of their race) is 
visible and obvious, disparate impact accounts for most if not all 
discrimination in the post-Civil Rights era health care. Disparate 
impact is rarely visible, obvious, or even conscious. Even the most 
obvious and most visible forms of disparate impact—for example, the 
relocation of hospitals out of predominantly minority communities 
(the only type of disparate impact that has been challenged in 
court)—have generally failed to overcome the business necessity 
arguments of providers.63  
Most disparate impacts are much subtler. Why, for example, do 
hospitals—the only component of the U.S. health system to be 
effectively desegregated—now have a length of stay and a bed 
capacity less than half of what existed in the early days of Medicare? 
Both the length of stay and the hospital bed-to-population ratios of 
the United States are now the lowest of any developed country in the 
world.64 Indeed, U.S. hospitals have become almost comparable to the 
intensive care units first integrated in southern medical school 
hospitals in the early 1960s. While shorter hospital stays impact all 
patients regardless of race or income, minority and low-income 
communities typically lack the home care and other resources of more 
affluent communities to absorb these shorter stays. Consequently, 
hospital readmission rates are higher. The ACA attempts to address 
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the general problem of readmission rates; however, it does not address 
the disparate impact. 
The implementation of the ACA, however, offers an opportunity 
equivalent to the one so successfully captured with the 
implementation of Medicare fifty years ago.65 The ACA involves a 
similar infusion of new public funding and takes a similar forward-
looking approach to nondiscrimination. It also attempts to address 
three of the major limitations of the earlier effort: transparency, full 
accountability, and greater universality.  
A. Transparency 
The ACA requires for the first time that federally funded health 
insurers and health care providers collect and report data about the 
race, ethnicity, and language of the patients they serve. Long overdue, 
it offers the opportunity to move away from a largely ineffectual 
complaint based system of enforcement. In an era where all 
transactions with health providers and their insurers are electronic, it 
involves little additional cost and certainly makes the compliance 
process more efficient. This data-reporting requirement can describe 
the degree of segregation and discrimination (or lack of it) that 
actually exists and lead to the development of standards and 
strategies for monitoring and ensuring compliance with those 
standards. It provides a breath of fresh air to a debate that has 
involved all too much posturing, finger pointing, and distrust. 
B. Full Accountability 
The ACA specifically extends the reach of civil rights compliance 
to all health plans and providers receiving federal funds. That 
includes private health plans and physicians historically exempted 
because Part B of Medicare was defined as a “contract of insurance.” 
It also expands and standardizes compliance related to race, ethnicity, 
language, disability, and sex, thus making the compliance less vague 
by specifically focusing on its application to health care. 
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Medicare program. 
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C. Greater Universality of Coverage 
The ACA also takes a step toward federally supported universal 
coverage. This greater universality makes it easier to get compliance 
from providers (opting out of public programs ceases to be a viable 
alternative). It also directs more attention toward disparities. 
Disparities become more important the more they affect the premiums 
that everyone else pays. In addition, the ACA requires that nonprofit 
hospitals conduct a community needs assessment every two years or 
face penalties. With the right community input, such a process has 
the potential of creating some of the sense of social solidarity in 
health care otherwise absent in the United States. 
Conclusion 
The challenge, of course, is to recover the strengths that the Title 
VI compliance process benefited from in the implementation of 
Medicare. That includes recapturing the spirit of the grassroots social 
movement that made it possible. It includes, through data and other 
means, exposing the adversaries that have been so well concealed in 
the modern health system and using all members of a willing, invisible 
army composed of community leaders, health professionals, and public 
officials that drove the earlier reforms. It means making full use of 
both the power of the federal purse and the sense of social solidarity 
that combined both the ethical and economic Golden Rules so 
effectively in the implementation of Medicare. It means recapturing a 
sense of public ownership and urgency, a sense that if we do not get it 
right this time, we may never get another chance.  
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